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Case Note
CRIMINAL LAW—The Consequences of Involuntary Medication:
Misunderstanding Mental Illness and Misapplying Legal Precedent;
United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2014)
Jasmine M. Fathalla*
I. Introduction
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court articulated a four-factor test in
Sell v. United States to determine when antipsychotic medications can be forced
upon a defendant to restore mental competency to stand trial.1 The Sell test
enables courts to balance governmental interests and individual liberty interests
when States seek to medicate mentally ill defendants.2 However, lack of proper
knowledge regarding issues related to mental illness has resulted in differing
interpretations of the Sell test.3 For instance, some courts have shown great
deference to governmental interests over individual liberty interests, which is
contrary to the intent of the Sell opinion.4
United States v. Breedlove exemplifies how the Sell test has been misapplied.5
Although the court correctly stated each prong of the Sell test, it failed to
understand the intent behind the test as a whole, resulting in an incomplete
analysis and improper authorization to involuntarily medicate the defendant.
This note begins in Section II by discussing mental illness as it relates to the
criminal justice system.6 Then, this note explains the development of the Sell test
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2016. B.S. Ball State University 2009. I would
like to thank Professor Diane Courselle for providing beneficial feedback and critiques on this
piece, Professor Jason Robison for the encouragement and support to pursue an education in both
Psychology and Law, and the student editors of the 2014 Wyoming Law Review for their dedication
and support throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank Ms. Megan New and Mr.
James Peters for their constant support and encouragement throughout my legal education.
1

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

2

Id.

For example, some courts have shown deference to the governmental interests over the
individual liberty interests and vice versa. These inconsistencies have led to differing dispositions.
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bradley, 417 F.3d
1107 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806 (4th Cir.
2009); United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d
369 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Debenedetto, 744 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Chavez, 734 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2014).
3

4

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

5

See United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2014)

6

See infra notes 10–31 and accompanying text.
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and the Sell opinion.7 Section III examines the factual background of the principal
case, and Section IV concludes by explaining how the court misapplied the Sell
test.8 Specifically, Breedlove misinterpreted the Sell test because it failed to consider
special circumstances lessening the governmental interest, the potential for side
effects of administered medication, less intrusive alternatives to that medication,
and the medical appropriateness of the medication.9

II. Background
A. Mental Illness
A mental illness is “a disease that causes mild to severe disturbances in thought
and/or behavior, resulting in an inability to cope with life’s ordinary demands
and routines.”10 Mental illnesses may affect people of any age, race, religion, or
socioeconomic status.11 In the United States, approximately one in four adults, or
61.5 million Americans experience a mental illness in a given year.12 Keeping this
statistic in mind, it is important for society to understand that mental illnesses
are nondiscriminatory medical conditions that disrupt an individual’s mood,
cognition, ability to communicate with others, and daily functioning.13 Of those
who experience a mental illness, an estimated 13.6 million Americans endure
the consequences of a serious mental illness.14 Serious mental illnesses include
major depression disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive
disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, as well as, borderline
personality disorder.15 Based on the prevalence of mental illness in society, it
is unsurprising that in the United States correctional facilities, roughly twenty
percent of state inmates and twenty-one percent of local jail inmates have histories
of mental health impairments.16
7

See infra notes 32–112 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 113–205 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 136–198 and accompanying text.

Mental Illness and the Family: Recognizing Warning Signs and How to Cope, Mental Health
America, http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/recognizing-warning-signs (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
10

11

See infra note 13 and accompanying text.

Ken Duckworth M.D., Mental Illness Facts and Numbers, National Alliance on Mental
Illness (2013) [hereinafter Facts and Numbers], available at http://www.nami.org/factsheets/mental
illness_factsheet.pdf (emphasis added) (stating that an estimated 9.2 million Americans suffer from
co-occurring mental health and addiction disorders).
12

13
Mental Illnesses, National Alliance on Mental Illness, http://www.nami.org (last visited
Jan. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Mental Illnesses] (explaining mental illnesses are nondiscriminatory because
individuals of any age, race, religion, or income may be affected).
14

Facts and Numbers, supra note 12.

Mental Illnesses, supra note 13. “Approximately 1.1 percent of American adults—about 2.4
million people—live with schizophrenia.” Facts and Numbers, supra note 12. “Approximately 2.6
percent of American adults—6.1 million people—live with bipolar disorder.” Facts and Numbers,
supra note 12.
15

16

Facts and Numbers, supra note 12.
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Although mental illnesses affect many individuals each year, there is
continually a lack of societal knowledge regarding these medical conditions.17
Because many people do not understand mental illnesses, perceptions of the
mentally ill are often skewed; sometimes these perceptions are generated from
fear.18 To explain why fear contributes to forming skewed perceptions of the
mentally ill, the words of H.P. Lovecraft echo loudly: “The oldest and strongest
emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind of fear is fear of
the unknown.”19 Linking mental illness with the unknown illuminates why
skewed perceptions of the mentally ill exist. These perceptions affect peoples’
beliefs and attitudes toward the mentally ill, which then shapes the interactions,
opportunities, and support systems provided to those with mental illnesses.20 Fear
of the mentally ill is perpetuated in society through cultural stereotypes, media
influences, institutional practices, and past restrictions.21 For example, a common
cultural stereotype is that “individuals with mental illness are significantly more
likely to commit violent crimes.”22 Although some people with mental illnesses
do commit crimes, public perceptions of the mentally ill as criminally dangerous
are exaggerated.23 This exaggeration is enhanced when random, senseless, or
unpredictable violent acts occur in society.24
One way to counterbalance the stigmas associated with mental illness is
through spreading awareness.25 Awareness is especially important in the legal
See generally Rene Scheffer, Addressing Stigma Increasing: Public Understanding of Mental
Illness, Center for Addiction and Mental Health (2003) [hereinafter Addressing Stigma], available
at https://knowledgex.camh.net/policy_health/diversity_hr/Documents/addressing_stigma_senate
pres03.pdf.
17

18
See Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, World Psychiatry 121–22
(2003) [hereinafter Violence and Mental Illness], available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC1525086/pdf/wpa020121.pdf.
19
H.P. Lovecraft, Supernatural Horror
tions 1973).

in

Literature (E.F. Bleiler ed., Dover Publica

20
Rosemarie Kobau et al., Attitudes Toward Mental Illness: Results From the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System, BRFSS Mental Illness Stigma Report 3 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Attitudes Toward Mental Illness], available at http://
www.cdc.gov/hrqol/Mental_Health_Reports/pdf/BRFSS_Report_InsidePages.pdf (discussing that
society’s attitudes and beliefs towards mental illness can “influence how policymakers allocate
resources to mental health services, pose challenges for staff retention in mental health settings,
result in poorer quality of medical care administered to people with mental illness, and create
fundraising challenges for organizations who serve people with mental illness and their families.”).
21

Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, supra note 20.

22

Addressing Stigma, supra note 17. See also Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, supra note 20.

Addressing Stigma, supra note 17 (“In fact, 80 to 90 percent of people with mental illness
never commit violent acts. They are more likely to have acts of violence committed against them,
particularly homeless individuals who may also have a mental illness.”).
23

24
Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 18; see also Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, supra
note 20; Addressing Stigma, supra note 17.

See generally Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, supra note 20; Addressing Stigma, supra note
17; and Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 18.
25
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sphere because stigmas pose particular problems for legal practitioners and
their clients, predominantly when issues of mental competency come forth.26
Given “mental illnesses are medical conditions that often result in a diminished
capacity for coping with the ordinary demands of life,” problems arise when
treatment is unavailable or unwanted.27 Because the United States Constitution
provides that no person “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,” an individual must be deemed competent to stand trial.28 Mental
competency is defined as “the intellectual and emotional capacity of the accused
to perform the functions which are essential to the fairness and accuracy of a
criminal proceeding.”29 Brilliantly, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia stated: “However strong and pervasive the public policy
to bring the morally responsible to bar, it cannot subvert the constitutional right
to a fair trial which is not afforded to an accused who is prosecuted while legally
incompetent.”30 Thus, competency problems arise if a mentally ill defendant is
accused of a crime and refuses medication. To resolve this conflict, courts engage
in a balancing test.31

B. Development of Sell
For courts to adequately balance both governmental interests and individual
liberty interests, they need to address the following question: Can the government
forcibly provide treatment to a mentally incompetent defendant in order to restore
competency to stand trial? Under, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, Congress responded to this
question in the affirmative.32 However, Congress failed to delineate the type of
treatment constitutionally permissible.33 Instead, Title 18 provides procedures for
courts to follow when issues of mental competency appear.34 Because Congress did

26

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

Mental Illnesses, supra note 13. Because mental illnesses do not have a cure, continuous
treatment is required. Mental Illnesses, supra note 13. However, even when an illness is adequately
managed through treatment, potential side effects could arise, therefore treatment should also be
continuously monitored. Mental Illnesses, supra note 13.
27

28
U.S. Const. amend. V; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(a)
(2014) (providing procedural safeguards for mentally incompetent criminal defendants).
29

United States v. Wilson, 263 F. Supp. 528, 532 (D.D.C. 1966).

30

Id.

31

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).

See 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Section 4241(a) states that both the defendant and the government
have the opportunity to file a motion for a hearing to determine mental competency. Id. Section
4241(b) permits the court to order a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant.
Id. Then in Section 4241(d) if the defendant is deemed incompetent at the hearing, the Attorney
General is able to hospitalize the defendant for treatment according to specific procedures. Id.
32

33

Id.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–4248 (2014). See 18 U.S.C § 4244, for the procedures for
hospitalizing a convicted person suffering from a mental disease or defect. See 18 U.S.C. § 4245,
34
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not explicitly define the type of treatment the government is able to administer to
a defendant, in 1990 and then again in 1992, the United States Supreme Court
set the foundation for determining when involuntary medication can be used
to restore competency.35 Specifically, the Court addressed the issue of when the
government is able to forcibly administer antipsychotic medications to a mentally
incompetent defendant.36 The theory for seeking to administer antipsychotic
drugs is to alter the chemical balance in the defendant’s brain, resulting in the
ability for the defendant to regain an organized, rational state of mind.37
In 1990, in Washington v. Harper, the Court held “the Due Process Clause
permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”38 In Harper, the
defendant was diagnosed with manic-depressive disorder after violating his parole
and returning to prison.39 Manic-depressive disorder, also known as bipolar
disorder, is a brain disorder that causes changes in an individual’s mood, energy,
and abilities to carry out daily tasks.40 People with bipolar disorder experience
“unusually intense emotional states that occur in distinct periods called ‘mood
episodes.’”41 Mood episodes are drastic changes from a person’s usual mood and
behavior.42 In Harper, the Court emphasized the importance of the individual’s
interest in refusing medication against the State’s interest.43 Moreover, the Court

for the procedures for hospitalizing an imprisoned person suffering from a mental disease or defect.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4246, for the procedures for hospitalizing a person due for release, but suffering
from a mental disease or defect.
35
See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
Note however, in Harper the court examined the issue of involuntary medication in a post-trial
context. In comparison, in Riggins, the court examined the issue of involuntary medication in a
pre-trial context.

See Washington, 494 U.S. 210; Riggins, 504 U.S. 127. “Antipsychotic drugs are used to treat
symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and have been shown
to improve daily functioning in individuals with these disorders.” United States Food and Drug
Administration, Drugs (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/ucm243903.htm.
36

37

See Harper, 494 U.S. at 215.

38

Id. at 277.

Id. at 213–14. Initially, the defendant voluntarily consented to the administration of
antipsychotic medication. Id.
39

40
Mental Health Information: Bipolar Disorder, National Institute of Mental Health (last
visited Jan. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Bipolar Disorder], available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/
topics/bipolar-disorder/index.shtml.
41

Bipolar Disorder, supra note 40 (citations omitted).

Bipolar Disorder, supra note 40 (“An overly joyful or excited state is called a manic episode,
and an extremely sad or hopeless state is called a depressive episode. Sometimes, a mood episode
includes symptoms of both mania and depression. This is called a mixed state. People with bipolar
disorder also may be explosive and irritable during a mood episode.”).
42

43

See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
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acknowledged that the individual has a significant liberty interest “in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”44
Two years after deciding Harper, the Court held in Riggins v. Nevada that the
Due Process Clause allows states to administer antipsychotic medication to an
involuntary defendant if the medication is medically appropriate, less intrusive
alternatives were considered, and if the medication is essential for the defendant’s
safety or the safety of others.45 In Riggins, the defendant was taken into custody
for murder and shortly thereafter, informed a private psychiatrist he was hearing
voices and having difficulties sleeping.46 The defendant initially consented to
antipsychotic medication, but once the Court deemed the defendant competent,
the medication was refused.47 In analyzing whether the defendant’s constitutional
rights were violated, the Court emphasized the importance of the individual
liberty interests at stake.48 Specifically, the Court acknowledged that forced
medication “represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”49
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the individual interest may be overcome
only by an essential or overriding state interest.50
After Riggins, the test for involuntary medication was generally considered by
courts to be a balancing test, weighing the state’s interest against the defendant’s
liberty interest.51 However, because neither the Riggins balancing test nor the
Harper test provided a bright-line rule, courts were able to invoke discretion in
deciding which test to follow; undoubtedly inconsistencies began to emerge.52
These inconsistencies led the United States Supreme Court to craft a definitive
test in Sell v. United States.53

44

Id.

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). The Court relied on Harper to reach the
holding. Id. The Court stated: “Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner
is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness.” Id.
45

46

Id. at 129.

Id. at 129–30 (“Riggins argued that continued administration of these drugs infringed
upon his freedom that the drugs’ effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny
him due process. Riggins also asserted that, because he would offer an insanity defense at trial, he
had a right to show jurors his ‘true mental state.’” (citations omitted)).
47

48

See id. at 133–36.

49

Id. at 134 (citations omitted).

50

Id.; see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79 (2003).

51

See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).

52

See supra note 3.

53

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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C. The Facts of Sell and Mental Illness
The defendant, Charles Sell, a once practicing dentist, had a long history of
mental illness.54 Sell began displaying mental abnormalities in September 1982,
and was subsequently hospitalized, treated, and discharged.55 From 1982 until
1997, Sell’s mental health slowly deteriorated.56 Then, in May 1997, Sell was
charged with submitting false insurance claims for payment.57 Although numerous
records indicated Sell suffered from a mental illness, he was nevertheless deemed
competent and was released on bail.58 One year later, Sell’s bail was revoked for
intimidating a witness.59 During that year, he was charged with attempting to
murder the arresting FBI agent and a testifying witness.60
These events led the court to reconsider Sell’s mental competency in 1999.61
Sell was sent to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners (“Center”)
for a mental health evaluation.62 Based upon the examination results, Sell was

54

Id. at 169.

Id. (“In September 1982, after telling doctors that the gold he used for fillings had been
contaminated by communists, Sell was hospitalized, treated with antipsychotic medication, and
subsequently discharged.”).
55

56

Id. The Court found:
In June 1984, Sell called the police to say that a leopard was outside his office
boarding a bus, and then asked the police to shoot him. Sell was again hospitalized
and subsequently released. On various occasions, he complained that public officials,
for example, a State Governor and a police chief, were trying to kill him. In April
1997, he told law enforcement personnel that he “spoke to God last night,” and that
“God told me every [Federal Bureau of Investigation] person I kill, a soul will be
saved.”

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 169–70 (“A grand jury later produced a superseding indictment charging Sell and his
wife with 56 counts of mail fraud, 6 counts of Medicaid fraud, and 1 count of money laundering.”).
57

Id. “A Federal Magistrate Judge (Magistrate), after ordering a psychiatric examination,
found Sell ‘currently competent,’ but noted that Sell might experience ‘a psychotic episode’ in the
future.” Id. (citations omitted).
58

59

Sell, 539 U.S. at 170. The Court found:
The Magistrate held a bail revocation hearing. Sell’s behavior at his initial appearance
was, in the judge’s words, “totally out of control,” involving “screaming and shouting,”
the use of “personal insults” and “racial epithets,” and spitting “in the judge’s face.” A
psychiatrist reported that Sell could not sleep because he expected the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) to “come busting through the door,” and concluded that Sell’s
condition had worsened. After considering that report and other testimony, the
Magistrate revoked Sell’s bail.

Id. (citations omitted).
60

Id. (“The attempted murder and fraud cases were joined for trial.”).

61

Id. at 170–71.

62

Id.
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deemed mentally incompetent and subsequently ordered to be hospitalized at the
Center for up to four months.63 The hospitalization was meant to determine if
there was a significant likelihood Sell would regain competency to stand trial.64
After two months at the Center, medical staff recommended antipsychotic
medication.65 However, because Sell refused the medication, medical staff then
requested to administer the drugs forceably.66 The request led to a hearing held
by the reviewing psychiatrist, which resulted in the authorization to forego Sell’s
refusal.67 This decision was premised on the determination that Sell was mentally
ill and dangerous, and antipsychotic medication was necessary to treat Sell’s mental
illness and restore his competency for trial.68 This rationale was supported by
evidence presented during the hearing that Sell had a type of delusional disorder
or schizophrenia.69
A delusional disorder affects a person’s ability to decipher reality from fiction.70
Delusions are false beliefs held to be true, contrary to reality.71 There are five types
of delusional disorders distinguishable from one another based on the type of
delusion experienced.72 People who have a delusional disorder do no not usually
experience hallucinations.73 Rather, these individuals maintain persistent, fixed
beliefs based on false realities.74 Additionally, delusional disorders are quite rare,

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Sell, 539 U.S. at 171.

66

Id.

67

Id.

Id. at 171–72. The evidence at the hearing included: “Sell’s current prosecutorial beliefs . . .
staff medical opinions . . . staff medical concerns . . . an outside medical expert’s opinion . . . and
Sell’s own views, as well as those of other laypersons who know him.” Id. (citations omitted).
68

69

Id.

Delusional Disorder, Harvard Health Publications (2014) [hereinafter Delusional
Disorder], available at http://www.drugs.com/health-guide/delusional-disorder.html (“Delusional
Disorder is classified as a psychotic disorder.”).
70

Delusional Disorder, supra note 70 (“Delusions, like all psychotic symptoms, can occur as
part of many different psychiatric disorders. But the term delusional disorder is used when delusions
are the most prominent symptom.”).
71

72
Delusional Disorder, supra note 70 (The five types of delusional disorders include:
(1) Erotomanic, which occurs when a person has a “delusion of a special, loving relationship with
another person, usually someone famous or of higher standing”; (2) Grandiose, which occurs when
a person has a “delusion that the person has a special power or ability, or a special relationship
with a powerful person or figure, such as the president, a celebrity or the Pope”; (3) Jealous, which
occurs when a person has a “delusion that a sexual partner is being unfaithful”; (4) Persecutory,
which occurs when a person has a “delusion that the person is being threatened or maltreated”; and
(5) Somatic, which occurs when a person has a “delusion of having a physical illness or defect.”).
73

Delusional Disorder, supra note 70.

74

Delusional Disorder, supra note 70.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/7
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and less frequently diagnosed than other illnesses.75 Because delusional disorder
is a rarity, doctors need to evaluate alternative illnesses, such as schizophrenia, for
a correct diagnosis.76 Schizophrenia is a chronic and severe brain disorder.77 To
diagnose someone with schizophrenia, doctors look to three broad categories of
symptoms: positive, negative, and cognitive.78 Some of these symptoms include
hearing voices, having delusions, or becoming withdrawn from society.79
After the reviewing psychiatrist determined Sell’s mental state and required
antipsychotic medication be administered, Sell moved to contest the State’s ability
to medicate him involuntarily.80 The lower courts agreed with the state that
involuntary medication of Sell was appropriate.81

D. The Sell Four-Factor Test
The Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard that must be applied in
order to resolve issues of whether a defendant can be subjected to involuntary
medication.82 In clarifying the test to be used, the Court acknowledged that both

75

See Delusional Disorder, supra note 70.

76

See Delusional Disorder, supra note 70.

Schizophrenia, National Institute of Mental Health (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
Schizophrenia], available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml#part1.
77

Schizophrenia, supra note 77. “Positive symptoms are psychotic behaviors not seen in
healthy people.” Id. Positive symptoms can include, hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders,
and movement disorders. Id. “Negative symptoms are associated with disruptions to normal
emotions and behaviors.” Id. Cognitive symptoms include an inability to understand information,
problems focusing, and an inability to apply information that was learned. Id. Both, negative and
cognitive symptoms are not easily detected when diagnosing a person with schizophrenia. Id.
78

79

Id.

80

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 172 (2003).

81

Id. at 172–75. The Court noted that:
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate’s order permitting Sell’s involuntary
medication. The court wrote that “anti-psychotic drugs are medically appropriate,”
that “they represent the only viable hope of rendering defendant competent to
stand trial,” and that “administration of such drugs appears necessary to serve the
government’s compelling interest in obtaining an adjudication of defendant’s guilt
or innocence of numerous and serious charges” (including fraud and attempted
murder). The court added that it was “premature” to consider whether “the effects of
medication might prejudice [Sell’s] defense at trial.”

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 169 (stating the issue as “whether the Constitution permits the Government to
administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant—in order to
render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes.”).
82

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 7

196

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada set the foundation for the Court to
build upon.83 Relying on precedent, the Court announced a four-factor test.84
First, for a court to find involuntary medication is necessary, it must find that
there is an important governmental interest at stake.85 To determine if the first
prong is met, the reviewing court must consider the individual facts of the case.86
Under this prong, the Court acknowledged that the Government has an important
interest to bring an accused to stand trial.87 However, if special circumstances are
present, the government’s interest is lessened.88 In Sell, the first prong was not
satisfied because “the lower courts did not consider that Sell [had] already been
confined at the Medical Center for a long period of time, and that his refusal to
take antipsychotic drugs might result in further lengthy confinement.”89 Further,
in United States v. White, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
length of time the defendant spent confined prior to trial, the nature of the crime,
the district court’s order to hospitalize the defendant, the defendant’s medical
condition, and the need to medicate the defendant involuntarily.90
Second, the involuntary medication must significantly further the Govern
ment’s interest.91 To fulfill this requirement, the reviewing court must determine
if the medication is substantially likely to restore the defendant’s competency for
trial.92 However, the court must also determine if the medication is substantially
unlikely to cause side effects that would significantly interfere with the defendant’s

Id. at 169, 177–79 (“Harper and Riggins, indicate that the Constitution permits the
Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious
criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment
is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness
of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests.”). See supra notes 38, 45 and accompanying text.
83

Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. Note how the Court describes the Sell test as a factor-type test,
not elemental. Id. Interestingly, throughout the opinion, the Court referred to these factors as
requirements. Id.
84

85

Id. at 180.

86

Id.

87

Id.

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. For example, a “defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . .
may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the
risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime.”
Id. Also, “it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of
commitment during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost. The potential for future
confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.” Id.
88

89

Id. at 186.

90

United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 413 (4th Cir. 2010).

91

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.

92

Id.
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ability to participate in the trial.93 If the court finds that the side effects would
prevent the defendant from actively assisting in the defense, the request for
involuntary medication must be denied because it would render the trial unfair.94
In Sell, the lower courts failed to satisfy this prong because the potential for side
effects were not adequately analyzed.95 The Court stated, “Whether a particular
drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communication with counsel,
prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to express
emotions are matters important in determining the permissibility of medication to
restore competence . . . .”96 Additionally, in United States v. Evans the court stated
the second prong of the Sell test must be examined with “sufficient particularity”
to be satisfied.97
Third, the medication must be necessary to further the Government’s
interest.98 For the Government to prove involuntary medication is necessary,
the court must find that no other, less intrusive, alternative would be likely
to achieve the same result.99 In Sell, the Court remanded the case to the lower
courts to determine this prong, acknowledging that nondrug therapies may be
effective in restoring competency, but noted alternative methods are sometimes
not as effective as medication.100 Additionally, in United States v. Chatmon, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order to involuntarily
medicate the defendant because “the court did not mention or analyze any of
the less intrusive alternatives suggested by the Supreme Court in Sell or by [the
defendant] himself.”101 In Chatmon, the court stated: “The question of when the
government may involuntarily administer psychotropic drugs to a defendant for
the purposes of rendering him competent to stand trial entails a difficult balance
between the defendant’s interest in refusing mind-altering medication and society’s

93

Id.

Id. For examples of side effects that would interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist in
a defense, see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
94

95

Id. at 185.

96

Id.

97

See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2005).

98

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.

See id. (explaining that “the Court must consider less intrusive means for administering the
drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before considering more
intrusive methods.”).
99

100

Id.

See United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 371 (4th Cir. 2013) (discussing forcible
medication “should be carefully scrutinized due to their impact on personal liberty”).
101
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interest in bringing the accused to trial.”102 Further, Chatmon characterized the
ability to involuntarily medicate a mentally ill defendant as a “drastic resort.”103
This framework emphasizes the importance of the individual interests in refusing
antipsychotic medications.104
Fourth, the medication must be medically appropriate.105 To determine if
the medication is medically appropriate, the reviewing court must decide if the
medication sought is in the defendant’s medical interest in light of his or her
medical condition.106 The Court in Sell remanded the case to the lower courts to
decide this prong.107 However, in Evans the court stated the analysis of the fourth
factor of the Sell test requires consideration of the defendant’s “particular mental
and physical condition.”108
Based on the four factors, the Court in Sell stated, “the present orders
authorizing forced administration of antipsychotic drugs cannot stand.”109
Because the lower courts did not consider all of the prongs in the test, the Court
remanded the case to the lower courts for further factual inquiry.110 The Court
also stated that because “Sell’s medical condition may have changed over time, the
Government should do so on the basis of current circumstance.”111
To illustrate the significance of Sell, the Court posited the following question
to future reviewing courts: “Has the Government, in light of the efficiency,
the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a

Id. at 373. In Chatmon, the defendant was indicted for “conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and heroin” and was subsequently “diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and deemed
incompetent to stand trial.” Id. at 371. The issue arose when the district court permitted the
government to involuntarily medicate the defendant. Id. On appeal, the court held, “Because careful
findings concerning the availability of less intrusive means are necessary to vindicate the Supreme
Court’s admonition that forcible medication motions should be carefully scrutinized due to their
impact on personal liberty, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings.”
Id. See also supra, notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
102

103
Chatmon, 718 F.3d at 373 (characterizing the “recourse to forced medication as a ‘drastic
resort’ that, if allowed to become ‘routine,’ could threaten an elementary ‘imperative of individual
liberty.’” (citations omitted)).

See id. This framework comports with Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada because
of the emphasis on the individual liberty interests rather than the governmental interests. See supra
notes 43– 44, 48–50 and accompanying text.
104

105

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.

Id. (“Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy
different levels of success.”).
106

107

Id. at 186.

108

United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2005).

109

Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.

110

Id.

111

Id.
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particular course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treat
ment sufficiently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in
refusing it?”112

III. Principal Case
United States v. Breedlove is an example of the Sell test misapplied. In
Breedlove the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit attempted
to abide by the precedent set forth in Sell to determine “whether a presentence
detainee may be involuntarily medicated in order to restore competency for
sentencing.”113 Although the court correctly stated each prong of the Sell test, it
failed to understand the intent behind the test as a whole. This failure resulted in
an incomplete analysis and the improper authorization to involuntarily medicate
the defendant.
The defendant, Norman Breedlove, agreed to testify against four
co-conspirators in a variety of drug trafficking and firearm offenses in exchange for
a sentence reduction.114 Prior to sentencing, Breedlove filed a Notice of Ineffective
Counsel on the premise that his counsel, the co-defendants, and the court system
were conspiring against him.115 After Breedlove was provided new counsel, a
mental health examination was requested.116 The attorney believed Breedlove
exhibited signs of “paranoid delusion.”117 Initially, the examination resulted in
a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis.118 Because of this diagnosis, Breedlove was
hospitalized and the administration of antipsychotic medication was subsequently
requested pursuant to Sell.119 A Sell hearing was conducted to determine the
appropriateness of involuntary medication.120 At the hearing, the psychologist
and psychiatrist explained their recommendation to involuntarily medicate

112

Id. at 183.

113

United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 2014).

114

Id. at 1038– 41 (reducing Breedlove’s sentence from life to ten years in prison).

115

Id.

116

Id.

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1038 –41. See also supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text
(explaining that delusional disorders are a rarity, and are difficult to properly diagnose). Regardless
of whether Breedlove was actually suffering from a delusional disorder, the delusion described is
consistent with persecutory delusion. See Delusional Disorder, supra note 70; see supra notes 70–76
and accompanying text.
117

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1038. See supra notes 76 –79 and accompanying text (explaining that
schizophrenia is a serious brain disorder in which three primary symptoms are generally found).
118

119

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1038.

A Sell hearing is a hearing in which evidence is presented to determine the medical
appropriateness of the medication sought to be administered. Id.
120
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Breedlove was premised on hours of face-to-face interviews and observations.121
The psychologist also admitted the recommendation was aimed more at restoring
competency than at individual therapy.122 Additionally, the psychiatrist testified
that the antipsychotic medication, called Haloperidol, was substantially likely to
restore the defendant’s competency.123 Haloperidol is a conventional antipsychotic
drug that decreases abnormal excitement in the brain.124 Although the psychiatrist
testified that Haloperidol could cause severe side effects, she remained confident
in her recommendation.125 The psychiatrist stated she was comfortable with the
Id. at 1039 (“Their testimony was also, at least in part, influenced by a study that Dr.
Reardon authored with two other colleagues (the Butner study), which examined all federal
detainees treated under Sell between 2003 and 2009 and determined that 79% of all treatment
resulted in restored competency, and that the success rate rose to 93% for individuals with the
same disorder as Breedlove.”). It is important to note the difference between psychologists and
psychiatrists. “Practicing psychologists have the professional training and clinical skills to help
people learn to cope more effectively with life issues and mental health problems. After years of
graduate school and supervised training, they become licensed by their states to provide a number of
services, including evaluations and psychotherapy.” What do Practicing Psychologists do?, American
Psychological Association, http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/about-psychologists.aspx (last visited
Jan. 2, 2015). In contrast, a psychiatrist is a doctor,
121

who specializes in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental health and
emotional problems. Because of extensive medical training, the psychiatrist under
stands the body’s functions and the complex relationship between emotional illness
and other medical illness. The psychiatrist is thus the mental health professional and
physician best qualified to distinguish between physical and psychological causes of
both mental and physical distress.
What is a Psychiatrist, American Psychiatric Association, http://www.psychiatry.org/medicalstudents/what-is-a-psychiatrist (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
122

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039.

Id. “Haloperidol is used to treat psychotic disorders (conditions that cause difficulty telling
the difference between things or ideas that are real and things or ideas that are not real).” Haloperidol,
MedlinePlus [hereinafter Haloperidol], http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/
a682180.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
123

124
Haloperidol, supra note 123 (“Haloperidol may help control [a] condition, but it will not
cure it.”). Haloperidol comes in the form of a tablet or a concentrated liquid to be taken by mouth
every day at around the same time. Haloperidol, supra note 123. It is generally understood that when
starting to take Haloperidol, a doctor will initially prescribe a low dose and then gradually increase
the dose as needed, however, once the condition is deemed controlled, the doctor may decrease the
dose as well. Haloperidol, supra note 123.
125
Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039. Some side effects that can result from taking Haloperidol
include, but are not limited to the following:

Drowsiness, dry mouth, increased saliva, blurred vision, loss of appetite, constipation,
diarrhea, heartburn, nausea, vomiting, difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep, blank
facial expression, uncontrollable eye movements, unusual, slowed, or uncontrollable
movements of any part of the body, restlessness, agitation, nervousness, mood
changes, dizziness, headache, breast enlargement or pain, breast milk production,
missed menstrual periods, decreased sexual ability in men, increased sexual desire,
difficulty urinating, fever, muscle stiffness, confusion, fast or irregular heartbeat,
sweating, decreased thirst, neck cramps, tongue that sticks out of the mouth, tightness
in the throat, difficulty breathing or swallowing, fine, worm-like tongue movements,
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treatment plan because Breedlove would be monitored to detect any side effects
and to adjust treatment accordingly.126
Shortly after the Sell hearing, Breedlove’s counsel moved to have his client
reevaluated.127 The motion was based solely on the attorney’s observations and
conclusions.128 After the District Court reviewed the evidence, the court denied
the request for reevaluation and granted the request to involuntarily medicate
Breedlove.129 The court stated the motion for reevaluation was denied because
“the counsel’s expertise was in the law, not psychology” and preferred to rely on
the testifying doctors instead.130
On appeal, the circuit court examined the district court’s findings and
concluded the Sell test satisfied.131 The court affirmed the first factor of the Sell
test because Breedlove’s crimes were sufficiently serious.132 The second factor was
satisfied because the court relied on the recommendation of the psychologist and
psychiatrist that the medication would likely restore the defendant’s competency.133
The court also agreed that the third factor of the Sell test was satisfied based
on the testimony of the psychologist and psychiatrist that alternative treatments
would be substantially unlikely to restore the defendant’s competency.134 Finally,
the appellate court found the fourth Sell factor was satisfied because “the district
court’s instructions and reference to the government’s detailed treatment plan
satisfied its burden under Sell, even if a maximum dosage was not explicitly
included in the district court’s order.”135

IV. Analysis
In Breedlove, the court correctly stated each prong of the Sell test, but failed
to understand the intent behind the test as a whole, resulting in an incomplete
analysis and the improper authorization to involuntarily medicate the defendant.

uncontrollable, rhythmic face, mouth, or jaw movements, seizures, eye pain or
discoloration, decreased vision, especially at night, seeing everything with a brown
tint, rash, yellowing of the skin or eyes, and erection that lasts for hours.
Haloperidol, supra note 123.
126

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id. at 1039– 40.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 1041.

133

Id. at 1041–42.

134

Id. at 1042– 43.

135

Id. at 1043.
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Additionally, Breedlove was wrongly decided because the court failed to consider
special circumstances lessening the governmental interest, the potential for side
effects of administered medication, less intrusive alternatives to that medication,
and its medical appropriateness.136 Further, the court showed great deference to
the governmental interests over the individual liberty interests throughout the
application of the Sell test. Because the court did not give adequate weight to the
individual liberty interests, as required by Harper and Riggins, the court failed to
understand the intent behind the Sell opinion.137 Moreover, in United States v.
White, the court stated, “we think the Supreme Court intended to pay more than
lip service to the imperative of the individual liberty in the admonishment that
forced medication is constitutionally permissible in “limited circumstances.”138

A. The Government Must have an Important Interest
In Breedlove, the reviewing court claimed the first factor of the Sell test to
be the most “contentious”, but did not explain why.139 The first factor requires
the court to determine if an important governmental interest is at stake.140 In
Sell, the Court was not distressed over this first factor; it merely requires the
reviewing court to look to the specific facts of a case to determine if any special
circumstances exist.141 In application, it was clear that the governmental interest
in forcefully medicating Breedlove was to restore his competency to proceed with
the sentencing hearing.142 Similarly, in Sell it was recognized that the government
will always have an important interest in bringing the accused to stand trial, but
if special circumstances are present the government’s interest is lessened.143
To illustrate how special circumstances may lessen the government’s interest,
Sell provided the example that a defendant’s failure to voluntarily take medication “may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and
that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment
one who has committed a serious crime.”144 Based on this example, Sell indicated
that the reviewing court must identify the severity of the crime to properly
apply the first prong in the test.145 However, Sell did not provide courts a clear

136

See infra notes 139–205 and accompanying text.

See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
133–136 (1992); see also supra notes 43–44, 48–50 and accompanying text.
137

138

United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 422 (4th Cir. 2010).

139

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1040.

140

Id.

141

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.

142

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1040.

143

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.

144

Id. at 180; see supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.

145

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
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standard to follow. This silence caused inconsistent results.146 Because of these
inconsistencies, two years after Sell, in United States v. Evans, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit developed a standard for seriousness.147
The standard requires courts to look to the maximum penalty authorized by
Congress to determine the severity of the crime.148
In Breedlove, the court adopted this standard, concluding that, because
Breedlove’s crime carried the maximum statutory penalty of life imprisonment,
the crime was serious.149 However, the court failed to consider a special
circumstance in this case: Breedlove’s sentence was only ten years as a result of a
plea bargain, not life imprisonment.150 The reduced sentence and plea bargain are
evidence of a reduced governmental interest. Because the court did not consider
this circumstance, it failed to comply with the intent of the first prong in the
Sell test.151
Even though Breedlove recognized both aspects of the first prong, including
the government’s desire to sentence the defendant and to scrutinize the seriousness
of the crime, the court skipped the analysis of the former and instead focused
on the latter.152 The intent behind the first Sell factor was to require courts to
examine all relevant factual circumstances of a case, including the government’s
interest and any special circumstances that might lessen the government’s
interest.153 Failing to accurately frame the Sell test in the first prong created
difficulties throughout the entire analysis. Because the court did not fully examine
both competing interests, the analysis favored the governmental interests.154

B. The Medication Must Significantly Further the Governmental Interest
The second prong of the Sell test requires the reviewing court to find that the
medication significantly furthers the government’s interest.155 Moreover, the court
must find the medication substantially likely to render the defendant competent,

146

See supra note 3.

See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining “it is appropriate
to focus on the maximum penalty authorized by statute in determining if a crime is ‘serious’ for
involuntary medication purposes. Such an approach respects legislative judgments regarding the
severity of the crime . . . while at the same time giving courts an objective standard to apply . . . .”).
147

148

Id.

149

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1041.

150

See id. at 1038; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.

151

See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.

152

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1040.

153

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).

154

See United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2014).

155

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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and substantially unlikely to have adverse side effects.156 In Breedlove, the court
relied heavily on the testimony of the psychiatrist and psychologist to find the
second prong satisfied.157 However, the court failed to delve into the reliability of
the experts’ recommendations. Instead, the court accepted the experts’ testimony,
which favored involuntary medication.158
The court’s analysis of this prong poses specific problems. For example, there
was not a determinative diagnosis of Breedlove.159 It is difficult to understand
how the court, without a specific diagnosis, could have declared the medication
substantially likely to restore competency. In fact, the psychologist disputed the
initial diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.160 Further, the inquiry of Breedlove’s
mental state was premised solely on Breedlove’s accusations that his previous
counsel, co-defendants, and the court system were conspiring against him.161 This
evidence was not the product of a mental health evaluation.162 Rather, Breedlove’s
counsel requested the mental health evaluation based upon these accusations.163
The experts’ recommendation to involuntarily medicate Breedlove was derived
from only hours of face-to-face interviews, observations, and a contested study.164
In contrast, the defendant in Sell underwent two months of constant supervision
prior to the medical staff recommending antipsychotic drugs.165
In Breedlove, the court also failed to fully analyze the potential for the
medication to cause severe side effects.166 Failing to examine this aspect of the
second prong defies the intent of the Sell test. The Sell opinion relied on both
Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada, which emphasized the individual
liberty interests.167 Courts are required to examine the potential side effects in
order to weigh the individual liberty interests fairly against the governmental

156

Id.

157

Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1041.

158

See id. at 1039–40.

159

See id. at 1038–39.

160

See id.

161

See id. at 1038.

162

See id. at 1038–41; see supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.

163

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1038– 41; see supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039 (noting the study “examined all federal detainees
treated under Sell between 2003 and 2009 and determined that 79% of all treatment resulted in
restored competency, and that the success rate rose to 93% for individuals with the same disorder
as Breedlove.”).
164

165

See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text.

166

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1041– 42.

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221
(1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–36 (1992). See also supra notes 43– 44, 48–50 and
accompanying text.
167
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interests.168 The only evidence for potential side effects from the medication was the
psychiatrist’s testimony that despite the side effects, Haloperidol was substantially
likely to restore Breedlove’s competency.169 The psychiatrist testified that some
of the potential side effects are “severe and irreversible in their most serious
manifestations.”170 Nevertheless, the court disregarded these statements because
the psychiatrist claimed to be comfortable with the treatment plan.171Additionally,
the psychologist testified that the medication might cause several benefits, such as
a reduced stress level.172 Although the court specifically noted the potential benefit
for a reduced stress level, the court did not discuss or disclose the negative side
effects that could occur.173 Some side effects of Haloperidol include drowsiness,
vomiting, uncontrollable eye movements, unusual, slowed, or uncontrollable
movements of any part of the body, confusion, difficulty breathing or swallowing
and seizures.174 In Breedlove, the court did not mention any of these side effects,
nor did the court discuss the possibility the side effects could interfere with
Breedlove’s ability to assist in the defense.175
The analysis of the second prong, in Breedlove, strayed from the intent of the
Sell test because the court failed to discuss the potential for side effects.176 The
analysis of the second prong also lessened the importance of the individual liberty
interests at stake, contrary to the intent of both Harper and Riggins, upon which
the Court in Sell relied.177 Additionally, in Breedlove, the defense attorney
exemplified why legal practitioners need to understand issues related to mental
illnesses in order to avoid unfavorable dispositions. A basic foundation of knowl
edge will lead to sounder arguments, credibility, and beneficial communications
between attorneys and clients.178

C. The Medication Must be Necessary to Further the Governmental Interest
The third prong of the Sell test requires the reviewing court to find the
medication necessary to further the government’s interest.179 In order to fulfill

168

See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.

169

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id. at 1038–40.

174

Haloperidol, supra note 123; see supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.

175

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1039.

176

Compare id. at 1041–42, with Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).

See Sell, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–36 (1992). See also supra notes 43–44, 48–50 and accompanying text.
177

178

See supra notes 10–31 and accompanying text.

179

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1042.
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this requirement, there must be no other, less intrusive, alternative likely to
obtain the same results.180 In Breedlove, to satisfy this prong, the court relied on
the opinions of the psychologist and psychiatrist “that therapy or other nonmedication based treatments would be substantially unlikely to restore Breedlove’s
competency. . . .”181 However, at no point in the opinion did the court mention,
nor inquire into, any alternative to forced medication.182 Because the court failed
to adequately analyze other possible treatments, Breedlove strayed from the intent
of the Sell test.183
The court attempted to satisfy the third prong by stating forced injections
would occur only if Breedlove first refused the medication orally.184 This
alternative method is no alternative at all because the method still required
Breedlove to be involuntarily medicated. Additionally, Breedlove argued that
the government failed to prove that he would “not regain competency on his
own, rendering non-treatment a viable, less intrusive alternative.”185 The court
rejected this argument stating “there was clear and convincing evidence that
administration of Haloperidol was necessary to restore Breedlove’s competence
and that his competence was unlikely to be restored with alternative treatments,
much less no treatment.”186 This conclusion was based upon the testimony of
the psychologist and psychiatrist.187 The court also refused to credit the defense’s
claim that Breedlove’s condition had improved based on the defense attorney’s
observations.188 Because the defendant’s request for a second mental health
evaluation was premised on the defense attorney’s observations, and not medical
expertise, the court denied the request.189
The court failed to comply with the third prong of the Sell test because
alternative methods to forced medication were not examined. By demanding
that no other, less intrusive, alternative be available to achieve the same results
as forced medication, this prong encourages courts to emphasize the individual
180

Id.

181

Id.

182

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036.

See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221
(1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–36 (1992). See also supra notes 43–44, 48–50 and
accompanying text.
183

184

See Breedlove, 756 F.3d at 1042.

185

Id.

Id. at 1043 (stating that Breedlove’s argument failed because “according to the district
court, the government’s experts convincingly testified to the opposite” and “the court did not credit
Breedlove’s assertion, through his counsel, that his condition was improving.”).
186

187

Id.

188

Id.

Id.; compare supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text, with supra notes 129–130 and
accompanying text.
189
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liberty interests involved.190 For a court to satisfy the third prong in the Sell test,
the court must identify alternatives, and then decide involuntary medication is
the best choice.191

D. The Medication Must be Medically Appropriate
Finally, to satisfy the Sell test the reviewing court must find the medication
medically appropriate.192 To determine if the medication is medically appropriate,
the court must decide if the medication is in the defendant’s best interest, in
light of his or her medical condition.193 This prong requires courts to take into
consideration the diagnosis and personal medical history of the defendant.194 In
Breedlove, the court applied the fourth prong inconsistently with the purpose of
the Sell test because the court did not emphasize the individual liberty interests
of the defendant. Further, the court did not consider the diagnosis or the
defendant’s medical history. For instance, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the medication was inappropriate because the purpose was to restore
competency, not individual therapy.195 Because the psychologist testified the
medication was aimed solely at restoring competency, the governmental interest
outweighed Breedlove’s personal medical interests.196 However, to satisfy the fourth
prong, the court must decide that the medication is medically appropriate for the
specific defendant.197 This inquiry requires the court to evaluate the defendant’s
individual needs. Additionally, because the experts disagreed on the diagnosis
ascribed to Breedlove, and because the court failed to adequately examine the
potential for side effects, the medication was not medically appropriate.198

E. Mental Illness Education
The Sell test was designed to enable courts to “make the ultimate
constitutionally required judgment.”199 Specifically, Sell established the test courts
must follow when issues of involuntary medication arise.200 This test is significant
because the Court drew lines, defining the government’s interests against the
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individual liberty interests in a medical context.201 By creating these distinctions,
psychiatry merged into the law, shining light on mental illness. Sell exemplifies
why legal practitioners need to be versed on matters related to mental illnesses,
especially when dealing with issues of involuntary medication.202 The fourth
prong in the Sell test requires courts to examine not only the medical diagnosis
of the defendant’s mental illness, but also the appropriateness of treatment.203
As a result, legal practitioners are compelled to educate themselves on mental
illnesses.204 Simply relying on an expert is inadequate. In order to ethically and
professionally represent a mentally ill client, and properly apply the Sell test, an
attorney must understand his or her client’s mental condition.205

V. Conclusion
United States v. Breedlove is an example of how one court misapplied the Sell
test.206 Misapplications of the Sell test stem from not understanding the purpose
of the test.207 The Court developed the Sell test to enhance the ideals from
Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada.208 In both Harper and Riggins, the
Court acknowledged the important governmental interest in bringing an accused
to stand trial, yet sought to limit a state’s ability to medicate an involuntary
defendant.209 The Sell test adopted these ideals because each factor requires courts
to analyze, in-depth, the individual liberty interests at stake.210 Because each
prong is aimed at protecting individual liberty interests, Sell exemplifies the need
for legal practitioners to become aware of the issues related to mental illnesses in
order to comply with the four factors. For example, in Breedlove, although the
defense attorney vigilantly attempted to provide insight to the court regarding the
defendant’s mental state, the attempts were unsuccessful because the court refused
to credit the attorney’s observations.211 Additionally, Breedlove is an example of
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how a court has interpreted Sell to show great deference to the governmental
interests over the individual liberty interests.212 However, because courts, like
Breedlove, have misapplied the Sell test, inconsistencies have blossomed.213 To
resolve these inconsistencies, legal practitioners must become educated on mental
illness to adequately represent mentally ill clients.
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